The main thrust of his argument in this section involves an attempt to contrast the grounded methodologist rooted in the practicalities of research (Pawson) with the rootless theorist obsessed with disconnected doctrines (Porter) .
Unsurprisingly, I do not accept this characterisation.
As a general observation, all research, whether explicitly or implicitly, is More specifically, while I respect Pawson's aspiration to drive realism into research practice (Pawson and Tilley, 1997) , in his efforts to do so he has never shied away from pontificating on matters philosophical. I assume this is because he accepts that Realist Evaluation (RE) requires a cogent theoretical foundation. But whatever his motivation, the fact remains that he has frequently presented readers with ontological, epistemological and axiological arguments, so he can hardly complain when they are subjected to scrutiny.
Conversely, his assertion that 'not a jot, not an iota of the empirical work is discernable within Porter's fragmentary "deconstructions"' (134) is simply false. Each of the three main sections of my paper includes an illustrative discussion of empirical RE that I have engaged in. His accusation that my critique fails to interweave principle and practice has no merit.
Pawson's attempt to rule my arguments out of court because of the terrain I place them on is a dangerous ploy. As he observes, 'an obstinate method which fails to learn will ossify or die' (133). May I suggest that, in his reluctance to countenance critical analysis of RE because it addresses ontological and axiological issues, it is Pawson rather than me who is displaying obstinacy? As will be seen, his distain for my supposed pretence to philosophical perfection, combined with his persistent tendency to use argumentative gambits of dubious pertinence, means that he rarely engages directly with the substance of my arguments. This is unfortunate because it is through such engagement that we can all learn. This section begins with Pawson complaining that in citing his use of the value-laden terms 'poor performance' and 'inappropriate behaviour' in his explanation of the origins of interventions, I 'do not even bother to mention that the research in question [from whence he states these terms are taken] is a review of so-called naming-and-shaming programmes' (134). The reason why I didn't mention it is not because I couldn't be bothered but because there is absolutely no indication in his text that this is the origin of his statement, not even a citation. All there is is a bald didactic pronouncement that I treated as such.
In response, he argues that the use of ostensive definition in his invisible review means that my 'stricture on conceptual exactitude misses the point' (134). I have no idea what stricture on conceptual exactitude he is talking about. I wasn't concerned with the exactness or otherwise of these concepts.
What interested me was their expression of values and how researchers might choose to approach those values.
He goes on to provide a clear explanation of the contingencies that characterise the causal chains involved in policy initiatives, concluding that 'outcomes, by and large, are at variance with policy expectation. In short there are no givens here' (134). I am happy to acknowledge the important insight that the outcomes resulting from interventions should never be taken as givens, but those were not the 'givens' that my argument related to. Instead, I
was pointing to the danger of researchers taking the value judgements of 
Facts?
Pawson takes me to task for suggesting an affinity between his position and Weber's (1949) notion of social scientific value freedom 'whereby the scientist is mandated to take an objective, value-neutral approach to her subjects' (Porter 2015a: 248) . Pawson counters this by pointing out that he has never cited and does not accept Weber's views on objectivity. But I didn't assert that he accepted Weber's position, simply that there was an affinity between the two positions. What is odd is that Pawson then goes on to confirm that affinity:
'As a matter of fact, I do believe that research should cherish the aspiration to be objective' (135).
It gets odder. In support of his contention that 'objectivity does not reside in the search for facts' (135), he uses an example that assumes three facts:
A job creation scheme may be regarded as a 'success' as measured by significant recruitment from the unemployed, or as a 'failure' because the jobs created are largely part-time and short-term (135).
That jobs are created and that most of them are part-time and short-term are all presented as empirically established facts. Of course, the quotation also indicates that their interpretation can differ widely. That's why the remit of social science includes both measurement and interpretation, and why any claim to explanatory power has to take account of both. Given these truisms, it is perplexing that Pawson has committed himself to this self-contradiction, whereby on the one hand he discounts facts, and on the other he counts them.
Taking a more sensible tack, he continues by noting that observation is always theory-laden (though not determined by theory); that data always require interpretation; and that the pursuit of objectivity is a social process (Pawson's preferred process being one that relies on the distinctly Machiavellian attributes of distrust combined with ambition). His argument is that had I been sufficiently well-read to be aware of these points, I would not have accused him of having an affinity with Weber. But this contention depends on the oxymoronic assumption that the founder of interpretive sociology didn't accept that observation is theory-laden, or that data require interpretation, or that science is a social activity. It falls on all three counts.
Values?
Pawson starts this section with a vigorous condemnation of emancipatory approaches which he characterises as deciding a priori what the world ought to be and then criticising those who depart from this view as deceitful. He uses Bhaskar's (1979) adoption of the Marxist concept of false consciousness as an alleged example of this. Maybe being a nursing scholar adds to the degree to which I am sensitised to this issue, in that a pretty much universally shared assumption in nursing research and practice is that the avoidance of avoidable suffering of patients is a paramount value position. In other human sciences, matters may be less clear-cut, but that does not obviate the need to address the same principles.
Change?
Pawson charges me with misrepresenting him by asserting that RE elides social structure and agency in a manner that is similar to, and therefore shares similar problems with, Anthony Giddens' (1984) Social mechanisms are thus about people's choices and the capacities they derive from group membership. We find the same combination of agency and structure employed generally across sociological explanation and we thus suppose that the evaluation of social programs will deploy identical explanatory forms, reaching 'down' to the layers of individual reasoning and 'up' to the collective resources on offer (1997:66). 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 I concur with Pawson's second reservation that using formulae runs the risk of encouraging overly mechanical interpretations. My excuse for doing so is that I was responding to the pre-existing categorical construct of context + mechanism = outcome which, for good or ill, has become the signature motif of RE.
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His third reservation is based on the observation that the evaluator's task is to address the particular dynamics of the specific social situation being researched, a task that requires flexibility and imagination. I agree. But he then states that 'no amount of conceptual musing can help in this, the vital task' (137). The smokescreen of sarcasm that follows this statement fails to hide its weakness. If he had said that no amount of conceptual musing can 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 Wise researchers begin with a broad attachment to a paradigm, select a subset of protocols most pertinent to the scope of their enquiry and then (Pawson, 2016a: 138-9 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 My disappointment with Pawson's reply is that, for the most part, he chose not to take this sort of approach. Rather than concentrating directly on the merits or demerits of my arguments, he decided to take the route of diversion, conjecture and disparaging imputation. In turn, rather than getting to the nub of the matter, I have had to use my response to point out the diversions, refute the conjectures and rebuff the disparagements. Pawson's avoidance of issues of substance means that the dialogue between us hasn't really moved the debate on very much. Unless, that is, we make the reasonable inference that his substantive silence gives grudging consent. 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60 
